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  1ABSTRACT 
 
This paper demonstrates the potential for induced preference experiments to test previously 
unverified explanations of observed behavior in contingent valuation surveys.  The NOAA Panel 
on Contingent Valuation called for experimental evidence on potential biases in the double 
referendum format.  We test Carson, Groves, and Machina’s [6] simple cost uncertainty and 
weighted averaging explanations of inconsistent responses to follow-up offers in such double 
referenda against a baseline of certainty and truthful preference revelation.  The results find 
evidence to support the weighted average hypothesis. Results regarding the cost uncertainty 










  2AN EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATION OF EXPLANATIONS FOR  
INCONSISTENCIES IN RESPONSES TO SECOND OFFERS IN DOUBLE  
REFERENDA  
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
 
In 1993, the NOAA Panel on Contingent Valuation recommended the use of the hypothetical 
referendum question format in surveys designed to estimate losses associated with natural 
resource damage.  A hypothetical referendum question asks, for example, “If your cost for 
program A were $D per year, would you vote for program A?”  The panel recommended the 
hypothetical referendum format, because, 
...as far as strategic reasons go, a respondent who would not be willing to pay D dollars has 
no reason to answer “Yes,” and a respondent who would be willing to pay D dollars has no 
reason to answer “No.” ([3], p. 4606) 
Practitioners of contingent valuation often employ double referendum questions (frequently 
referred to as double bounded dichotomous choice formats) to generate estimates for willingness 
to pay.  This form of referendum requires the respondent to answer two ‘YES-NO’ questions of 
the type: “Would you pay $D for A?”  The first question poses a value of $D previously selected 
from a range of values.  The second question poses a value taken from a sub-range (either higher 
or lower than $D) that depends on the respondent’s answer to the first question.  Arguments 
favoring the use of the double referendum format in surveys center on its simplicity and the 
substantial gains in statistical efficiency compared to asking only one question [10]. 
An important stylized fact regarding double referendum surveys is that the mean or median 
willingness to pay estimated using responses to the first valuation question often differs from that 
estimated using responses to both the first and second questions.   Furthermore, the error terms of 
  3the two estimated valuations are not perfectly correlated.   The number of negative responses to 
the second question is often higher than would be expected from the distribution of values based 
on responses to the first question alone [10, 12]. A higher than expected frequency of Yes-Yes 
and No-No responses has also been observed [5].  A number of econometric methods to address 
this issue have been proposed (e.g. [2, 5]).  Several theoretical explanations are advanced for 
respondents’ inconsistent responses to the first and second referendum questions in DeShazo [9] 
and Carson, Groves, and Machina [6], hereafter CGM. 
Part of the Blue Ribbon Panel’s recommendations about contingent valuation includes an 
admonishment about the use of survey formats that deviate from the simple single referendum 
format.  In its Guidelines for Value Elicitation Surveys, the panel states,  “If a double-bounded 
dichotomous choice or some other question form is used in order to obtain more information per 
respondent, experiments should be developed to investigate biases that may be introduced ” ([3], 
p. 4612).  Given the inconsistencies in WTP estimates based on the first and second responses 
described above and the concerns of the NOAA Panel regarding double-bounded dichotomous 
choice surveys, it is interesting that there has been no experimental research on the topic to date.  
The research to date has focused on single referenda [4, 7, 13].  While the results of these studies 
diverge somewhat, it seems timely to begin a parallel research agenda centered on double 
referenda.  Indeed, it is likely that results from such studies, depending on their design, can 
provide further evidence on responses to single referendum questions as well.     
In this paper, we report the results of a set of experiments designed to test two of the four 
theoretical explanations proposed by CGM to explain the stylized facts about double referendum 
surveys.  We term these two theoretical explanations the Weighted Average hypothesis and the 
Uncertain Cost hypothesis. The purpose of these experiments is to determine if subject behavior 
  4is consistent with the theoretical predictions when the incentives described in the theories are 
induced, consistent with the use of experiments as a means of theory falsification (Davis and 
Holt [8], p. 32).  Our purpose is not to replicate a double bounded dichotomous choice field 
survey in the laboratory. Instead, using a single referendum question we replicate and study the 
effect of the types of uncertainty that CGM suggest occur when subjects respond to the second 
round questions in a double referendum. This allows us to isolate and test whether CGM’s 
theoretical explanations, when induced in a laboratory setting, will produce subject responses 
which are consistent with their predictions and are capable of explaining observed behavior in 
the second round of a double referendum.   
Our results provide support for the CGM Weighted Average hypothesis.  However, the results 
do not provide clear evidence regarding the Uncertain Cost hypothesis.  While our findings do 
provide some insight into possible explanations of subject behavior when responding to double 
referendum surveys, we do not claim to provide definitive evidence regarding which type of 
response is actually driving behavior observed in the field.  This is perhaps an aim for future 
experiments.   Thus, the paper should be seen in the wider context of demonstrating how induced 
preference experiments can be used to aid understanding of the CV process. Such experiments 
could be used to test new theoretical explanations of subject behavior and/or to aid in the 
development of new empirical methods to obtain improved willingness to pay estimates from 
field survey data. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 contains a description of the 
theories posed by CGM to explain observed responses to double bounded dichotomous choice 
surveys.  The experimental design is described in Section 3.  We report the results in Section 4 
and present some concluding thoughts in Section 5. 
  52. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
CGM hypothesize about possible subject behaviors that may explain the stylized facts 
associated with double-bounded dichotomous choice contingent valuation questions.  It is 
important to note that when willingness to pay distributions are estimated, it is assumed that 
subjects are not responding strategically to the valuation questions.  In addition, it is assumed 
that subjects accept the costs presented to them as certain.  Therefore, the estimated distributions 
of willingness to pay are generated under the assumptions of certainty and truthful preference 
revelation.  A violation of either of these assumptions could generate the empirical irregularities 
observed in contingent valuation data.  All of the hypotheses in CGM address the issue of subject 
uncertainty about cost.  This uncertainty stems from the fact that subjects are asked two 
willingness to pay questions during the course of the survey.  The nature of subject uncertainty 
determines the optimal response.  CGM hypothesize that there are four possible effects of the 
second valuation question, which we will term the Uncertain Cost, Weighted Average, 
Bargaining, and Quantity/Quality Shift hypotheses. These four hypotheses are described in turn 
below. 
In the Uncertain Cost hypothesis, subjects respond to the uncertainty created by the second 
valuation question by treating the second question independently from the first, but treating the 
new cost as an uncertain value with a mean equal to the second stated cost amount.  Thus, 
respondents’ risk preferences play a role in determining their answers to the second question.  
CGM make an additional assumption that subjects are risk averse.  As a result, the distribution of 
stated willingness to pay will be skewed to the left as more subjects respond “No” to the second 
question than if the cost were known with certainty. 
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that the true cost is ‘somewhere in the middle’ of the two costs suggested by the survey 
administrator.  As a result, subjects answer the follow up question as if the cost were a weighted 
average of the first and second costs, where the weights sum to one.  This behavior results in 
responses to the follow up question that are more extreme than responses to a certain second 
cost.  To see why, consider subjects whose values for the good lie in between the first and second 
costs.  Under certainty, such a subject will respond either “No-Yes” or “Yes-No” to the two 
valuation questions, depending on whether the first offered cost is higher or lower than the 
subject’s value.  However, in the weighted average case, subjects who respond “No” initially are 
more likely to respond “No” a second time, since the weighted average of the two costs exceeds 
the lower bound of the cost range.  Similarly, subjects who respond “Yes” initially are more 
likely to respond “Yes” to the follow up question as well since the weighted average is less than 
the upper bound of the cost range.  This hypothesis predicts that there will be more “Yes-Yes” 
and “No-No” responses to the two questions than if the second cost were known with certainty. 
The Uncertain Cost and Weighted Average hypotheses are observationally distinct and, as 
theories, are relatively clear. We test these two hypotheses in this paper. This is not true of the 
two further hypotheses offered in CGM, which we label the  Bargaining hypothesis and the 
Quantity/Quality Shift hypothesis.  
The Bargaining hypothesis is based on the intuition that respondents may react to the second 
stated cost amount by assuming that they are now in a bargaining situation. This is particularly 
plausible if one remembers that the person implementing the survey is responding as if he or she 
were bargaining with the respondent (i.e. if the respondent says “Yes”’ to the first stated cost 
amount, the cost amount is raised, but the cost amount is lowered if the respondent says “No”).  
  7CGM suggest this intuition implies that respondents are more likely to say “No” to the second 
cost amount because they hope it will lead to a lowering of any subsequent offers. 
CGM do not offer an explicit bargaining model and their stated arguments imply the same 
predictions as the Uncertain Cost hypothesis. In fact, psychological intuitions aside, there 
appears to be no difference between these two hypotheses. Consider a two person bargaining 
situation where neither knows the other’s preferences. When considering a response to any offer, 
the information available to a respondent is the set of possible cost options, a set of beliefs about 
those options (i.e. a probability distribution over the cost options) and preferences that include 
attitudes towards the good and towards risk. In other words, the model becomes similar to the 
model in the Uncertain Cost hypothesis.  Thus, our experimental test of the Uncertain Cost 
hypothesis is also an indirect test of the Bargaining hypothesis, where it is assumed that the 
subject believes the cost amounts are normally distributed.     
The Quantity/Quality Shift hypothesis is based on the intuition that respondents take the price 
signal to be an indicator of the amount of good on offer or the quality of the good. When offered 
the second cost amount, the respondent takes this to indicate that a new good is being offered 
since it has a different price. Thus those who are offered a higher cost amount in the second 
round are more likely to say “Yes” because they feel that a new, better or bigger, good is being 
offered. Likewise, those who are offered a lower second cost amount are more likely to say “No” 
because they feel they are being offered a new, lower quality, or smaller, good. 
We find it difficult to interpret this hypothesis from an economic perspective, although as 
stated, it appears observationally equivalent to the Weighted Average hypothesis. Consider 
respondents who are offered lower cost amounts, so that they believe that the good now being 
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good relative to other goods, their beliefs about the quality (or quantity) change and the amount 
the price has changed.  In fact, if the price has fallen enough, it may increase the likelihood of 
wanting to pay for the good. This is another way of saying that the response to a change in price 
and quantity of a good depends on the own-price elasticity of demand for that good. Without 
further information, we feel this hypothesis requires very strong assumptions about the price 
elasticity of environmental goods in order to make clear predictions about responses.  Thus, we 
do not test this hypothesis in the experiment. 
Table I summarizes the predictions of these four hypotheses.  There are four possible response 
combinations to the two valuation questions: “Yes-Yes,” “Yes-No,” “No-Yes,” and “No-No.”  
The first column depicts the number of each type of response predicted under certainty and 
truthful preference revelation.  A, B, C, and D represent non-negative amounts of each response 
type that depend on the distribution of values for the public good in the sample population.  The 
values in columns 2, 3, 4, and 5 reflect how the observed responses for each hypothesis are 
predicted to differ from the certainty, truthful preference revelation baseline.  Clearly, the 
Uncertain Cost and Bargaining hypotheses predict similar deviations from the baseline, as do the 
Weighted Average and Quantity/Quality Shift hypotheses.  Columns 1, 2, and 4 are relevant to 
the description of the experimental design that follows.  Because these four hypotheses result in 
only two observationally distinct vote distributions, we test only two joint hypotheses: Uncertain 
Cost/Bargaining and Weighted Average/Quantity-Quality Shift.  We induce incentive structures 
consistent with those described in the Uncertain Cost and Weighted Average hypotheses to test 
these two compound hypotheses.   
TABLE I ABOUT HERE 
  93.  EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
One of the difficulties with replicating the incentives present in a double-bounded referendum 
in an experimental laboratory is that subjects in the field do not know that they are going to be 
asked a second valuation question until the moment that the question is posed to them.   
Implementing this aspect of contingent valuation surveys generates problems in a controlled 
laboratory setting where, to conform to proper experimental protocol, subjects must be fully 
informed of experimental procedures from the outset ([8], p. 23).  Thus, while from the 
perspective of a CV practitioner or a behavioral economist, a sequential, double referendum 
might seem the most natural and appropriate design, it is not only problematic but also incorrect. 
It is problematic since telling subjects at the beginning that they will be asked two questions 
can generate strategic responses to the first question, particularly if subjects know that they will 
receive a lower cost offer in the second question if they respond “No” to the first question.  Since 
the hypotheses we wish to test require truthful preference revelation in the first question, it is not 
possible to incorporate this type of two-question approach into the design of the experiment. 
One potential solution to the problem of potential strategic responses to the first question 
would be to design the experiment in two parts.  Subjects play part one, which corresponds to the 
first referendum question, with the knowledge that the experiment has two parts and that each 
part is played as a separate game.  However, they would not know the rules of the game for part 
two until after they completed part one.  Part two would then correspond to the theoretical 
conditions described by CGM.   
This approach is incorrect because it will not always be possible to create the incentive 
structures described by CGM.  Their hypotheses center solely around responses to the second 
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subjects will always respond truthfully to the first question.  In fact, some studies (e.g. [13]) that 
find no difference in behavior in real and hypothetical referenda indicate that this lack of bias is 
at least in part a result of non-incentive compatible behavior in real referenda such as what would 
comprise part one of such a sequential experiment.  This result is troubling, as the assignment of 
costs in part two of the experiment must be conditional on the part one response.  It is not clear 
how to assign a cost in part two to a subject who gives a non-incentive compatible response in 
part one.  As a result, a sequential design could result in outcomes different from CGM’s 
predictions simply because subject behavior in the first round deviates from that specified by the 
theory.  While such behavior is certainly an interesting issue, it is not the focus of this 
experiment.  The purpose here is to investigate responses to the second question of a double 
referendum under the specific conditions of uncertainty described by CGM.  Therefore, we 
require a design that meets the criteria specified in the theoretical models.   
Consequently, we employ a “virtual” first round followed by a one-shot referendum.  Here, 
subjects play only one round under the (experimental) assumption that they have played a 
previous one-shot round in which they truthfully revealed their preferences, consistent with the 
(econometric) assumption that respondents truthfully reveal their preferences when responding to 
the first bid amount in a referendum contingent valuation study [5].  Further, [4] provide 
experimental evidence to support this assumption. 
 The first round is virtual in the sense that subjects do not actually play it.  However, given 
their assigned value and cost and the assumption of truthful preference revelation, it is possible 
to predict what subjects would have voted in this round.  This “virtual first vote” then determines 
the cost that subjects are offered in the second, or actual round, which is the only round that 
  11subjects play.  For example, if a subject’s assigned value exceeds the initial offered cost, his or 
her virtual first vote is “Yes.”  The subject is then offered a cost higher than the initial cost in the 
actual round.  If a subject’s assigned value is less than the first offered cost, his or her virtual first 
vote is “No.”  The subject will then be offered a cost lower than the initial cost in the actual 
round.  Figure 1 depicts how subjects’ assigned values, costs, and virtual votes determine their 
cost assignments in the actual round of the experiment.  We describe the details of the 
experimental design below. 
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
3.1. General Experimental Procedures 
Two hundred sixteen cadets from the United States Air Force Academy participated in this 
experiment.  The sample size was determined via a power analysis using a range of assumptions 
about observed deviations between treatments, ranging from small to large.  Under very 
conservative assumptions, a sample size of 200 results in a power of approximately 0.80 at a 
level of significance of 0.05.  At this sample size, the power approaches one rapidly as deviations 
between treatments increase.  Because of the experimental design, the sample size must be 
divisible by 27.  Therefore, the sample size is 216.  Table II outlines the design matrix for the 
experiment. 
Subject recruitment was accomplished using posters and flyers and announcements in classes.  
Subjects were informed of the amount of time the experiment would take (approximately 30-45 
minutes) and average earnings ($10.00).
1 
TABLE II ABOUT HERE 
  12At each experimental session, 27 students arrive at a designated room at the designated time.  
Security measures are in place to ensure that no subject participates more than once.  Subjects 
are then randomly assigned to one of the three treatments, each of which occurs in a different 
room. By running all three treatments concurrently at each experimental session, we can reduce 
session-specific effects by randomly distributing subjects among treatments.  Once in the 
different rooms, each subject receives a blank envelope containing an instruction packet and a 
smaller envelope, which contains a ballot slip and “Investment Return Slip.”  The information in 
the experimental materials includes each subject’s assigned induced values.  These assignments 
were also randomly drawn from the overall distribution of induced values described below.  
The experimental design consists of three treatments: the Baseline treatment, the Uncertain 
Cost treatment, and the Weighted Average treatment.  In each treatment, the basic design of the 
experiment is the same.  Each of the 9 subjects is a shareholder in an imaginary investment 
company called “Experimental Investments Limited (EIL).”  The group must vote on whether 
EIL should make an investment for the group.  Each shareholder begins the experimental session 
with a total of 10 tokens.  Each shareholder knows how his or her cost of the investment will be 
determined and personal return from the investment.  EIL makes the investment if at least 6 of 
the 9 shareholders vote “Yes.”  If less than 6 shareholders vote “Yes,” then the session 
terminates and each shareholder completes the experiment with 10 tokens.
2  If the vote passes, 
then shareholders’ final token balance equals 10 minus their investment amount plus their return 
from the investment.  At the completion of a session, tokens are converted to dollars at the rate of 
$1.00 per token.  The only variable that differs between treatments is how shareholders’ 
individual costs of the investment are determined.  As a result, the instructions for each treatment 
  13differ in their description of this variable of interest.  The Appendix contains the relevant 
portions of the experimental instructions for each treatment.
3  
Table III presents the return and cost structures for the three treatments.  Table IV reports the 
predicted distributions of “Yes-Yes,” “Yes-No,” “No-Yes,” and “No-No” votes that result from 
the design of the virtual first round, the induced values and costs in the actual round, and 
predictions of the hypotheses proposed by CGM.  The high and very high value subjects’ values 
and costs determine the predicted numbers of “Yes-Yes” and “Yes-No” votes.  The low value 
subjects’ values and costs determine the predicted numbers of “No-Yes” and “No-No” votes.  
There are no predicted “No-No” votes in the Baseline treatment because we omit this subject 
type from the experimental design.  However, both the Uncertain Cost and Weighted Average 
hypotheses predict a positive number of “No-No” votes in this treatment.  Therefore, nonzero 
levels of “No-No” votes are one form of evidence for behavior that supports these hypotheses.    
TABLE III ABOUT HERE 
TABLE IV ABOUT HERE 
3.2. Detailed Treatment Procedures 
In the Baseline treatment, shareholders know their cost of the investment with certainty.   
Therefore, shareholders whose return exceeds their assigned cost are expected to vote “Yes” and 
shareholders whose return is less than their assigned cost are expected to vote “No.”  This 
treatment serves as the control and expected outcomes are identified in column 1 of Table IV.   
In the Uncertain Cost treatment, shareholders know that their cost of the investment will be 
drawn from a normal distribution. Although CGM do not explicitly state that respondents’ 
uncertainty about the cost takes the form of a normal distribution, we take as our starting point 
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distribution.  In the experiment, the normally distributed cost has a mean (MeanCost) as 
described in Table III and a standard deviation of 5.  Shareholders know their assigned 
MeanCost and see a table illustrating how their cost of the investment will be determined based 
on a drawing from a bag of cards numbered from 1 to 100.  This table is contained in the 
experimental instructions in the Appendix.  The drawing occurs after the vote and only if 6 of the 
9 shareholders vote “Yes.” It is important to note that the possible values of MeanCost equal the 
assigned costs that are known with certainty in the Baseline treatment.  Therefore, this treatment 
replicates the incentive structure described in the Uncertain Cost hypothesis.  Column 2 of Table 
IV reports the predicted outcomes from this treatment. 
In the Weighted Average treatment, shareholders know that their cost of the investment will 
be either a low value (LowCost) or a high value (HighCost).  Shareholders know their values of 
LowCost, HighCost, and their return from the investment.  They also know that their cost will be 
determined by two drawings from a bag of cards numbered from 1 to 100.  The first drawing 
occurs before the vote and determines the “threshold” number.   The threshold number randomly 
partitions the [1,100] interval into two segments.  The first is [1, threshold] and the second is 
[threshold + 1, 100].  The result of the first drawing sets the stage for a second drawing from the 
same pool of numbers that occurs only if the vote passes.  A draw from the first segment results 
in a shareholder cost of LowCost, and a draw from the second segment results in a shareholder 
cost of HighCost.  The larger is the first “threshold” draw, the higher is the probability that the 
second draw will result in a LowCost outcome.  Shareholders see a table summarizing the rules 
of the drawing, which is included in the Appendix.  The values of LowCost and HighCost 
correspond to the offered costs in the first and second valuation questions as depicted in Figure 
  151.  Whether a shareholder’s second cost is lower or higher than the first depends on the virtual 
vote, which in turn depends on the assigned return from the investment.  This treatment 
replicates the incentive structure described in the Weighted Average hypothesis.  Predicted 
outcomes are presented in column 3 of Table IV. 
4.  RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Table V reports the observed vote distributions in each treatment.  A cursory examination of 
the table indicates that subjects do behave in accordance with the predictions of economic theory 
in the case of the Baseline treatment.  Furthermore, the vote distribution in the Weighted 
Average treatment does move in the direction predicted by the hypothesis.  However, this is not 
the case for the Uncertain Cost treatment.  In particular, there are zero “No-No” votes in this 
treatment.  While this hypothesis predicts that the distribution will be shifted to the left of that 
resulting from the Baseline treatment, the data seem to indicate a shift to the right.  We can 
quantify these observations by testing the following hypotheses using Pearson’s chi-squared and 
Fisher’s exact tests as described in Agresti [1]: 
 
Hypothesis 1: The vote distributions in the Baseline and Uncertain Cost treatments are the same. 
 
Hypothesis 2: The vote distributions in the Baseline and Weighted Average treatments are the 
same. 
 
Failure to reject hypotheses 1 and 2 provides evidence that the changes in cost structures 
across treatments have no effect on subject behavior relative to that observed in the Baseline 
treatment.  Table VI reports the results of tests of hypotheses 1 and 2.
4   
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the 10% level of significance (p = 0.072).  There are two explanations for the weak rejection of 
this hypothesis.  The first is that subjects simply do not behave in accordance with the theoretical 
predictions associated with the Uncertain Cost hypothesis.  The second is that one of the 
assumptions of the theory is violated.  In particular, CGM argue that one will only observe an 
increase in “No” responses to the second question for risk averse subjects.  One possible 
explanation for this result is that this subject pool contains few risk averse subjects.   
A simple test for risk aversion conducted on a subsample of USAFA cadets revealed that 
approximately half of the subjects were risk loving or risk neutral. 
5  However, since there are no 
individual identifiers with the experimental data, it is not known how many, if any, of these 
subjects participated in the Uncertain Cost treatment.  If the risk preferences in the subsample 
that participated in the risk aversion test are representative of those in the cadet population, then 
the results of this test provide some insight into the outcome of the Uncertain Cost treatment.  
Clearly, the risk preferences of respondents are an important variable to consider if uncertainty is 
an issue in a survey.
 Knowledge of these preferences would be crucial to proper analysis of the 
data.  In summary, there is weak evidence to suggest that subjects invoke the Uncertain Cost 
hypothesis, albeit the direction of the effect is the opposite of that proposed by CGM.  This result 
indicates that further investigation of the hypothesis in a setting where the risk preferences of 
subjects are known is warranted.
 6 
We find strong evidence to reject Hypothesis 2.  We can reject the null hypothesis that the 
vote distributions in the Baseline and Weighted Average Treatments are the same at any standard 
level of significance (p = 0.003).  We further note that the distribution is as predicted by CGM. 
Therefore, subjects do behave in accordance with the predictions of the Weighted Average 
  17hypothesis.  If subjects take a weighted average of the presented costs when responding to a 
double-bounded field survey, then one should expect to obtain estimated willingness to pay 
distributions that are consistent with our results.   
In the presence of cost averaging, econometric methods can be applied to explicitly 
incorporate this information about subject behavior into the estimation procedure.
7  I t  i s  
interesting to note that such a model has similarities to one developed by Herriges and Shogren 
[11] to describe a model of anchoring in double referenda in which subjects update their WTP 
for the good based on the value of the first bid amount.  If subjects behave in this manner in 
response to double referenda, their behavior effectively widens the bounds placed on willingness 
to pay by the follow-up question.  By contrast, if subjects’ behavior is consistent with the 
weighted averaging model, the result is exactly the opposite.  Subject responses to the follow-up 
question effectively narrow the bounds on willingness to pay. 
TABLE V ABOUT HERE 
TABLE VI ABOUT HERE 
5.  CONCLUSIONS 
The experiment reported above was not designed to prove conclusively which, if any, of the 
tested hypotheses are adopted by individual respondents when faced with a follow up bid in a 
double referendum.  What we have done is to test the two proposed hypotheses under strict 
laboratory conditions to examine whether, when strongly induced, they are capable of generating 
the types of voting behavior both expected in theory and observed in the contingent valuation 
literature.  Our experimental findings, while not testing every possible explanation of apparently 
inconsistent observed responses, are a useful starting point in providing much needed empirical 
evidence in the area. 
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The implications of the results from the Weighted Average treatment are straightforward.  If 
such behavior is present within a particular sample of contingent valuation survey respondents 
then there will be significant differences in voting behavior over what would be the case 
compared to certain costs (i.e. our Baseline treatment).  This difference is in the direction 
proposed by CGM.  It is, however, difficult to draw definitive conclusions with respect to the 
Uncertain Cost hypothesis.   As currently formulated, CGM’s theory predicts that for risk averse 
subjects the difference in voting behavior between the Baseline and Uncertain Cost treatments 
will result in more “No” responses to the second question, as illustrated in Table I. Although we 
did observe significant differences at the 10% level between treatments, they were in the 
opposite direction to those proposed by CGM.  A sample that included a sufficient number of 
risk loving respondents would produce such a result.  To date, as far as we are aware, there is no 
evidence regarding the risk preferences of past contingent valuation survey respondents.   
Therefore, it is difficult to say whether the Uncertain Cost hypothesis has had any impact on 
contingent valuation survey results, whether in the direction predicted by CGM or in the 
direction found in our study. 
 
In closing we note that this paper demonstrates how appropriate procedures from mainstream 
experimental economics can be utilized to test previously unverified explanations of 
econometrically observed inconsistent voting in double referenda contingent valuation surveys.  
If subject behavior matches the theoretical predictions, and if the same outcomes are observed in 
the field, then these experimental results provide information for use in developing appropriate 
econometric techniques to apply to data from double bounded referendum surveys.  For example, 
  19if field data exhibit response patterns consistent with the Weighted Average hypothesis (more 
“Yes-Yes” and “No-No” responses than predicted), then it may be reasonable to incorporate 
information about the weighted average of the two offered costs into the log likelihood function 
used in the estimation procedure.     
      In addition, these results may be ultimately helpful in redesigning double referendum 
surveys to avoid the respondent uncertainty and resulting bias typically associated with the 
follow up bid.  While the results of this study are unable to generate specific recommendations in 
this regard, they do point out the direction for further research.  In order to generate information 
that will be useful in redesigning surveys, an experimental research agenda must answer three 
questions: 
(1) Is subject behavior consistent with the theoretical predictions when the conditions 
described in the theoretical model are induced? (Theory falsification) 
(2) Which theories seem to correspond to subject behavior in the field? (Theory selection) 
(3) How do alternative survey designs impact subject behavior? (Survey modification) 
The purpose of these experiments has been to begin to address question (1).  Future experimental 
research agendas may address alternative theories of behavior in double referenda, as well as 
address questions (2) and (3).  An alternative to question (3) is the development of new 
econometric estimators, such as the one described above, to model the behaviors identified in 
question (2). One response to question (3) may be to modify survey designs such as the double 
referendum to reduce possible impacts of design upon subject behavior. Another response 
described in this paper would be to develop new econometric estimators which model the actual 
subject behavior in double referenda as identified in question (2).  Ideally, these two lines of 
  20research would occur in parallel.  A systematic experimental research agenda such as the one 
outlined above can result in useful information for survey practitioners.    
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  23FOOTNOTES 
 
1 Weekly cadet take-home pay ranges from $65-$100.  Therefore, an additional $10 for less than an hour’s time 
represents a significant addition to a cadet’s weekly income.  Given this, there is no doubt that cadets took the 
experiment seriously. 
 
2 Students were made aware in the introduction to the experiment that while the experimental currency was tokens, 
these would be converted into dollar amounts at the end of the session. 
 
3 A complete package of all experimental materials is available from the authors upon request. 
 
 
4 It is useful to note that the vote distributions in the Weighted Average and Uncertain Cost treatment are also 
significantly different from each other at the 10% level (p = 0.071) 
 
5 Subjects make a series of ten choice decisions between two gambles, A and B.  Gamble A has a certain payoff of 
$3.  Gamble B has a payoff of either $6 or $1.  The probability of the $6 payoff changes from 0.1 to 1 across the ten 
choice decisions.  After subjects make the ten choices, a ten-sided die is rolled twice.  The first roll determines 
which of the ten choices will be used to compute the subjects’ earnings from the experiments.  The second roll 
determines whether subjects who chose gamble B for the relevant choice decision earn $6 or $1.  Subjects’ risk 
preferences can be determined by examining at what probability the subjects switch from choosing the certain 
gamble to choosing the risky one.  Instructions for the risk experiment are also available from the authors upon 
request. 
 
6 We attempted to re-run the Uncertain Cost treatment with a group of subjects at Queen’s University, Belfast, who 
were pre-screened to be risk averse.  However, only 8 of the 28 subjects who showed up for the experiment were 
determined to be risk averse.  It may very well be the case that those who self-select to participate in economics 
experiments may be more risk loving.   
 
7 Given the following: 
  WTP = f(X;θ,ε) = g(X;θ,ε) = exp(α)ε, where ε follows a lognormal distribution. 
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  B1i = the first bid amount offered to subject i 
  BLi = the second bid amount offered to subjects who respond “No” to B1i, BLi < B1i. 
BHi = the second bid amount offered to subjects who respond “Yes” to B1i, BHi > B1i. 
γ = the weight that subjects place on the first bid.  γ ∈ [0,1].   
I1i = 1 if subject i responds “No, No” to the two WTP questions, 0 otherwise. 
I2i = 1 if subject i responds “No, Yes” to the two WTP questions, 0 otherwise. 
I3i = 1 if subject i responds “Yes, No” to the two WTP questions, 0 otherwise. 
I4i = 1 if subject i responds “Yes, Yes” to the two WTP questions, 0 otherwise. 
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A complete derivation of this function is available upon request from the authors. 
  25TABLE I 
  Double Referendum Response Effects 











Yes-Yes  A  < A  < A  > A  > A 
Yes-No  B  > B  > B  < B  < B 
No-Yes  C  < C  < C  < C  < C 
No-No  D  > D  > D  > D  > D 
 
  26  Baseline Weighted 
Average 
Uncertain Cost  Totals 
Treatments per 
Session 
1 1 1  3 
Subjects per 
Session 
9 9 9  27
x Number of 
Experimental 
Sessions 
 x 8  x 8  x 8  x 8
= Total Subjects   72 72 72  216
 
Experimental Design Matrix 
TABLE II 
 
27  Baseline Weighted  Average  Uncertain  Cost 
Low Value Shareholder Type 
Return  16 tokens  16 tokens  16 tokens 
Cost 
Structure 
Certain cost of 
10 tokens 
Cost is either LowCost or 
HighCost 
Determined by Drawing 
LowCost = 10 tokens 
HighCost = 20 tokens 
Cost is normally distributed 
Mean = MeanCost,  σ= 5 
Determined by Drawing 
MeanCost = 10 tokens 
Subjects of 
this type per 
Treatment 
24 24 24
High Value Shareholder Type 
Return  26 tokens  26 tokens  26 tokens 
Cost 
Structure 
Certain cost of 
30 tokens 
Cost is either LowCost or 
HighCost 
Determined by Drawing 
LowCost = 20 tokens 
HighCost = 30 tokens 
Cost is normally distributed 
Mean = MeanCost,  σ= 5 
Determined by Drawing 
MeanCost = 30 tokens 
Subjects of 
this type per 
Treatment 
24 24 24
Very High Value Shareholder Type 
Return  32 tokens  32 tokens  32 tokens 
Cost  
Structure 
Certain cost of 
30 tokens 
Cost is either LowCost or 
HighCost 
Determined by Drawing 
LowCost = 20 tokens 
HighCost = 30 tokens 
Cost is normally distributed 
Mean = MeanCost,  σ= 5 
Determined by Drawing 
MeanCost = 30 tokens 
Subjects of 
this type per 
Treatment 
24  24 24
 





 Baseline  Uncertain  Cost  Weighted  Average 
Vote  Type     
Yes-Yes  24  < 24  > 24 
Yes-No  24  > 24  < 24 
No–Yes  24  < 24  < 24 
No-No  0  > 0  > 0 
 




 Baseline  Uncertain  Cost  Weighted  Average 
Vote  Type     
Yes-Yes  24 35 36 
Yes-No  24 13 12 
No–Yes  24 24 18 
No-No  0 0 6 
Observed Responses by Treatment 





Hypothesis 1 – H0: Baseline = Uncertain Cost 
Pearson’s Chi-Squared: p = 0.070                      Fisher’s Exact: p = 0.072 
Hypothesis 2 – H0: Baseline = Weighted Average 
Pearson’s Chi-Squared: p = 0.004                      Fisher’s Exact: p = 0.003 
  Hypothesis Test Results 
TABLE VI 
 
31APPENDIX   
 
  Experimental Investments Limited and Its Procedures (cont.) 
Experimental Instructions Excerpts  The EIL procedure is:  
 
  (i)  Each of you will open Envelope 1, which contains your VOTING SLIP.   
You will see your values of C and R on your VOTING SLIP.  DO NOT 
show these values to the other individuals in the room.  1.  Baseline Treatment Instructions 
2. Uncertain Cost Treatment Instructions   
3. Weighted Average Treatment Instructions  (ii)  Each of you will fill in the VOTING SLIP to indicate whether or not you 
wish EIL to invest C tokens on your behalf. Voting will be in private so 
the other members of EIL will not know how you voted.   
   
  (iii)  I will collect everyone’s VOTING SLIP in the ballot box and count the 
votes.  You will be able to verify this count at the end of the 
experimental session if you so desire. 
 
Experimental Investments Limited and Its Procedures 
Each of you is a shareholder in Experimental Investments Limited (EIL). As a shareholder, you 
will have the opportunity to vote on whether EIL will invest a number of tokens on your 
behalf.  To help you understand the investment we will use the following abbreviations: 
 
If less than 6 of you vote ‘YES’ to the proposal for EIL to invest C 
tokens on your behalf, then EIL will not make the investment. No 
deductions will be made from anyone’s account balance and no returns 
will be added to anyone’s account balance. 
 
C = your investment amount in tokens 
    R = your return from the investment in tokens  If 6 or more of you vote ‘YES’ to the proposal for EIL to invest C 
tokens on your behalf, then EIL will make the investment. As a 
shareholder, C tokens will be deducted from your account balance and R 
tokens, your return from the investment, will be added to your account 
balance. Even if you voted ‘NO,’ EIL will still invest C tokens on your 
behalf and you will still receive R tokens. 
 
If EIL votes to make the investment, then C tokens will be deducted from your account 
balance. You will know your value of C before you vote on the investment decision. Different 
people in the room have different values of C.  This value of C is private information.  Do not 
reveal your value of C to the other people in the room. 
    If EIL votes to make the investment, then R tokens will be added to your account balance.  Are there any questions?  You will know your value of R before you make the investment decision. Different people in 
the room have different values of R. This value of R is also private information.  Do not reveal 
your value of R to the other people in the room. 
 
 
Please turn the page.   
To summarize, if EIL votes to make the investment then C tokens will be deducted from your 
account balance and R tokens will be added to your account balance. When you make your 
investment decision you will know your values of C and R. 
 
 









Experimental Investments Limited and Its Procedures 
Each of you is a shareholder in Experimental Investments Limited (EIL). As a shareholder, you 
will have the opportunity to vote on whether EIL will invest a number of tokens on your 
behalf.  To help you understand the investment we will use the following abbreviations: 
 
C = your investment amount in tokens 
 
M = the average value of C for you 
 
R = your return from the investment in tokens 
 
If EIL votes to make the investment, then C tokens will be deducted from your account 
balance.  The value of C depends upon your value of M and the results of a drawing that I will 
conduct if EIL votes to make the investment.  I will explain how the drawing will work on the 
next page. 
 
You will know your value of M before you vote on the investment decision. Different people 
in the room have different values of M.  This value of M is private information.  Do not reveal 
your value of M to the other people in the room. 
 
If EIL votes to make the investment, then R tokens will be added to your account balance.  
You will know your value of R before you vote on the investment decision.  Different people 
in the room have different values of R.  This value of R is also private information.  Do not 
reveal your value of R to the other people in the room. 
 
 
Are there any questions? 
 
 
Please turn the page. 
 
The Drawing 
The outcome of a drawing will determine your investment amount.  We will only conduct this 
drawing if EIL votes to make the investment decision. 
 
The bag that I am holding contains 100 cards numbered from 1 to 100.  You may verify the 
numbers on the cards at any time during the experiment if you so desire.  If EIL votes to make 
the investment, I will ask one of you to draw one card from this bag and announce the number 
on the card.  This number will determine your investment amount, C. 
 
The table below explains how the value of C, your investment amount, depends upon the 
outcome of the drawing.  For example, if the number on the card drawn is 33, then your 
investment amount is M-2.  If the number on the card drawn is 86, then your investment 
amount is M + 5.   
 
You might find it helpful to know that the numbers in this table are based on a normal 
distribution with a mean of M and a standard deviation of 5.  
 
If the card number is:  Then the value of C is: 
1  M -10 
2 or 3  M - 9 
4 or 5  M - 8 
6, 7, or 8   M – 7 
9, 10, 11, or 12   M - 6 
13, 14, 15, 16 or 17   M - 5 
18, 19, 20, 21, 22, or 23   M - 4 
24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, or 30   M - 3 
31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, or 38   M - 2 
39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, or 46   M - 1 
47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, or 54   M 
55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, or 62   M + 1 
63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, or 70   M + 2 
71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, or 77   M + 3 
78, 79, 80, 81, 82, or 83   M + 4 
84, 85, 86, 87, or 88   M + 5 
89, 90, 91,or 92   M + 6 
93, 94, or 95   M + 7 
96 or 97  M + 8 
98 or 99  M + 9 
100  M + 10 
 
 
Please turn the page.  
Experimental Investments Limited and Its Procedures 
Each of you is a shareholder in Experimental Investments Limited (EIL). As a shareholder, you 
will have the opportunity to vote on whether EIL will invest a number of tokens on your 
behalf.  To help you understand the investment we will use the following abbreviations: 
 
L = your low investment amount in tokens 
 
H = your high investment amount in tokens 
 
R = your return from the investment in tokens 
 
If EIL votes to make the investment, then either L or H tokens will be deducted from your 
account balance.  The outcomes of two drawings will determine whether the investment 
amount deducted from your account is L or H.  I will explain how the drawings will work on 
the next page.  
 
You will know your values of L and H before you vote on the investment decision. Different 
people in the room have different values of L and H.  These values of L and H are private 
information.  Do not reveal your values of L and H to the other people in the room. 
 
If EIL votes to make the investment, then R tokens will be added to your account balance.  
You will know your value of R before you vote on the investment decision.  Different people 
in the room have different values of R.  This value of R is also private information.  Do not 
























The outcomes of two drawings will determine whether your investment amount is L or H.  The 
purpose of the first drawing is to determine the threshold number.  The threshold number 
indicates whether it is more likely that your investment amount will be L or that your 
investment amount will be H.  We will conduct this drawing before you vote to make the 
investment decision. 
 
The purpose of the second drawing is to determine which amount, L or H, is your investment 
amount.  We will only conduct the second drawing if EIL votes to make the investment 
decision. 
 
The bag that I am holding contains 100 cards numbered from 1 to 100.  You may verify the 
numbers on the cards at any time during the experiment if you so desire.  Before EIL votes on 
the investment decision, I will ask one of you to draw one card from the bag and announce the 
number on the card.  This number will determine the threshold number. 
 
The table below explains how the threshold number indicates the likelihood that your 
investment amount will be L or H.  If EIL votes to make the investment, we will conduct a 
second drawing to determine whether your investment amount is L or H in the same manner as 
we conduct the first drawing.   
 
If the card that we draw in the second drawing is numbered from 1 to the threshold number, 
then L tokens will be deducted from your account balance. 
 
If the card that we draw in the second drawing is numbered from the threshold number plus 
one to 100, then H tokens will be deducted from your account balance. 
 
You might find it helpful to know that the likelihood that your investment amount is L or H is 
based on a weighted average of L and H. 
 
If the card that we draw in the second 
drawing is numbered 
Then your investment amount is: 
 










Please turn the page. 
 
 
 